One goal of media is to broadly disseminate relevant information via different outlets (e.g., print and digital media) to the investment community. Given mass media's broad reach (which is certainly far broader than corporate and analyst reports and other firm-specific disclosures), information revealed through the media may influence investor decision-making (Sadique et al., 2008) . For instance, Fang & Peress (2009) claim that 55 million newspaper copies (not including online subscriptions) are sold to individual readers in the US, which is approximately 20% of the nation's population. Further, unobserved features that are generated through second-hand circulation of information by the media may convey a favourable or unfavourable image of the covered firm; and thus, shape corporate reputation 1 (Tong, 2013) .
The literature (Barber & Odean, 2008; Eccles & Vollbracht, 2006; Frieder & Subrahmanyam, 2005; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2005; Wei et al., 2013) suggests that firms with low reputational risk and positive emotional responses in the media are more likely to enjoy greater financial performance and that corporate reputation is positively associated with investor returns. However, numerous questions remain unanswered regarding corporate reputation and financial markets. For instance, does corporate reputation (i.e., framing of firms vis-à-vis good news/bad news media coverage) affect stock price performance? Can corporate reputation be used to identify well-performing investments? And can investors generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns from this information?
2 While previous studies (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2008; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2005) have examined the link between corporate reputation and return performance, it needs to be borne in mind that they rely on corporate reputation rankings that are not readily available for Australian listed firms. Against this background, we examine the role of the media in financial markets by examining an investment strategy specifically based on Australian corporate reputation.
In lieu of corporate reputation rankings we develop a new 'measure of media tone' to assess the corporate reputation of Australian firms. By doing so this allows dissecting whether market response to media is driven by an underlying unobservable construct, such as corporate reputation (Engelberg & Parson, 2011) . Specifically, we consider whether a trading strategy based on the corporate reputation of S&P ASX 200 listed companies in the media can earn excess risk-adjusted returns. We also contrast the pay-off of a corporate reputation trading strategy during different degrees of market stress. Empirical evidence suggests that managed funds underperform during changing market conditions due to inertial behaviour of fund managers who remain to bear the full brunt of falling markets (Ben-David et al., 2012) . Also, Wisniewski & Lambe (2013) claim that investors acting on negative sentiment in the media can improve their investment performance. Taken together, there is valid cause to compare the profitability of this trading strategy across divergent economic conditions.
The study adds to our understanding of the association of investment returns and corporate reputation by building on the work of Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al., (2008) . The main contribution of our paper is the development of a corporate reputation measure that quantifies how companies are presented ('framed') in the media. This further contributes to the efficient market and investor sentiment hypotheses, as we are able to empirically examine whether affective tone influences share price performance (which differs to Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al., (2008) who examine market sentiment not individual firm reputation). We also examine the relationship between corporate reputation and stock returns under different economic conditions, showing that divergent market conditions can moderate the effect of corporate reputation on stock returns. To our knowledge, this is the first study that empirically examines the effect of corporate reputation on stock returns of Australian companies across divergent economic conditions, addressing a noticeable absence in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of the literature and establishes the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and empirical approach adopted in the study. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 discusses the implications of our findings.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Corporate Reputation Conveyed in the Media
The term 'corporate reputation' is based on the idea that stakeholders' beliefs and evaluations of a company will be shaped by information received through the media (Deephouse, 2000) .
Indeed, the resource-based view suggests that a firm's reputation in the media may be best understood as a strategic intangible asset based on broad public recognition of the high quality of its capabilities and outputs, leading to sustained competitive advantage and increased performance (Deephouse, 2000; King & Whetten, 2008; Rindova et al., 2005) .
Although corporate information presented in the news is backward looking, the 'tone' and 'spin' of textual information accompanying the numbers can be inherently forward looking (Sadique et al., 2008) . The tone employed by the writer of the news story pertains to the use of positive/optimistic, neutral or negative/pessimistic words. The spin placed on news stories relates to the editor's positioning of information (e.g., whether to include or exclude news/information, first page or last, first paragraph or last, etc). Thus, the semantic content of media news articles may be able to indirectly provide state of mind constituencies, qualitative descriptions of future performance and valuable insights that quantitative economic fundamentals cannot (Ferguson et al., 2013) .
Corporate Reputation & Financial Markets
So how is corporate reputation perceived by market participants through the media? Research (Deephouse, 2000; Rindova et al., 2005) suggests that reputation in the media reflects collective recognition of a firm's 'demonstrated ability' to create value. Frieder & Subrahmanyam (2005) and Barber & Odean (2008) show that individuals are more likely to buy stock with strong brand recognition and that are 'attention-grabbing' in the news under the premise that they face difficulties when choosing which stock to buy from a large investment universe. Moreover, firms with low reputational risk and positive emotional responses in the media are more likely to enjoy underlying capabilities that produce consistent patterns of behaviour and performance (Barber & Odean, 2008; Eccles & Vollbracht, 2006; Frieder & Subrahmanyam, 2005; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2005; Wei et al., 2013) . Pfarrer et al., (2010) argue that this collective recognition of the ability to produce value regularly can moderate uncertainty even for stakeholders who lack experience with a firm, suggesting that high reputation firms encounter lesser penalties for negative news than firms with poor reputations. Eccles & Vollbracht (2006) also claim that while companies cannot control media agendas, they can improve the understanding and perception of their operations by the public and strengthen their overall reputation. The fact that adverse events that affect corporate reputation, such as corporate accidents, are associated with increased media attention and a negative share price reaction highlights the need to assess corporate reputation and return performance (Wei et al., 2013) .
Traditional finance theory suggests that trading on second-hand information circulated by the media should be a futile investment exercise. Fama's (1998) Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) in the semi-strong form posits that current prices reflect all publicly available information, so that media coverage should have no effect on future market activity. If one supposes that the media contains no new or useful information about past, present and future cash flows, then one would not anticipate any impact of corporate reputation on stock market performance.
However, there are empirical findings that question the information efficiency of financial markets, which lead researchers to reconsider the association between news coverage and asset prices. Empirical studies (Dyck & Zingales, 2003; Feng & Peress, 2009; Ferguson et al., 2013; Sadique et al., 2008; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008) have used qualitative textual analysis (via sophisticated linguistic algorithms) and trading strategies to examine the media effect on stock market performance. The collective findings suggest that by addressing the semantics of linguistics employed in news articles, it may be possible to gauge stock market reactions to such language and measure the effects of news events on stock returns. According to Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al., (2008) , these findings are reflected within theoretical models of investor sentiment and non-informational trading, in which non-rational traders depress stock prices in the short-run.
Given the alleged importance of a firm's representation in media outlets, we extend on this strand of research by examining the framing of companies by the media, i.e., the conveyed reputation by the media. It warrants further investigation into whether the affective language used in news stories can in fact influence return performance of listed companies. Both under the efficient market hypothesis, as well as under the investor sentiment theory, corporate reputation does not affect return performance but for different reasons: Any short-run share price changes arising from investor sentiment revert to fundamental equity values in the longrun, whereas under the efficient market hypothesis affective language will not affect stock returns unless it bears information that it is not yet reflected in stock prices. Accordingly, we hypothesize:
H1: Abnormal risk-adjusted returns cannot be generated using a firm's corporate reputation.
Another strand of research considers that media selectively focusses on certain types of information in certain economic conditions (Bhattacharya et al., 2009 
H2:
Abnormal risk-adjusted returns cannot be generated using a firm's corporate reputation before crisis events.
H3:
Abnormal risk-adjusted returns cannot be generated using a firm's corporate reputation during crisis events.
H4:
Abnormal risk-adjusted returns cannot be generated using a firm's corporate reputation after crisis events.
DATA & METHODS
Data & General Approach
We commence our data collection process We require firms to be listed for the entire time span to avoid bias due to initial public offer (IPO) underperformance or de-listing. It should also be noted that this requirement places more emphasis on larger firms within the sample. Since this selection process exposes the sample to potential full-data survivorship bias, we test for a significant return difference of the complete ASX 200 firms (as listed on 31 December 2003) and our sample, but find none. 4 Full data survivors are defined as a set of firms that are operational throughout the entire sample period (Rohleder et al., 2011) . To test for survivorship bias, we follow Bu & Lacey (2007) and test for a statistically significant return difference of our sample compared to the complete sample (dead and alive) for the entire sample period (i.e., January 2004 to December 2012). However, in contrast to Bu & Lacey (2007) , we do not include any firms Our next step is to collect relevant company news stories for the purpose of computing reputational measures. The news stories are obtained from the Factiva database for a period of nine consecutive years from January 2003 to December 2011. We restrict the sample to compute the media tone score to the top 100 yearly news stories ranked by relevance for each company, as we want to avoid news articles, in which the company is only mentioned in passing. This may distort the reputational score for this company. For example, if an article reports on a corporate accident by BHP and mentions Rio Tinto as its main competitor, then it would be distorting to use this news story to measure Rio Tinto's reputation. Therefore relevance ranking reflects how prominent a company features in a news article.
The search encompasses all Australian news sources ranging from online news wires (e.g.,
Australian Associated Press (AAP), Bloomberg, Reuters, etc) to print media (e.g., Australian
Financial Review, Sydney Morning Herald, The Australian, The Age, etc) to which investors may have access. We limit the sample of news coverage to the top 100 most relevant news articles, as psychological research suggests that attention is a limited resource and visual searches are difficult (Kahnemann, 1973) , and therefore a reader's attention can only focus on the most salient objects (Shipp, 2004) . When the search task becomes increasingly difficult, visual search performance deteriorates (Huang & Pashler, 2005) , which would imply that our restriction to 100 news stories is extremely conservative, as memorizing and recalling a wide array of news stories over multiple firms is a very difficult task. We then compute the reputational score as outlined in the section 'Measurement of Media Tone'.
The ensuing step is to collect monthly total returns for the companies. Monthly stock price data and dividend information is sourced from SIRCA and DatAnalysis. For the analysis, we that entered the ASX 200 after 31 December 2003 to avoid potential look-ahead bias. Further, instead of using a parametric t-test, we perform the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U and Sign test, since the underlying time series of returns are found to be not normally distributed, as evident in significant Jarque-Bera χ 2 -statistics. (2000) bull markets show high returns combined with low volatility, while bear markets are characterised by low returns and high return volatility (which is consistent with the data periods chosen in this study).
Measurement of Media Tone
The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) was used to analyse how the content of each media article may affect the individual reader (Pennebaker et al., 2006) . LIWC classifies the and negative tone (NEGTONE) to total word count. 6 We then combine these two ratios into one singular media tone measure (MEDTONE) using the coefficient of imbalance formula as employed by Tong (2013) :
where P is the number of positive words, N the number of negative words, and T the total number of positive and negative words. The coefficient ranges from complete negative (-1) to complete positive (1) corporate reputation coverage.
Empirical Analysis of Risk-adjusted Returns
To test our hypotheses, we sort firms based on their lagged media tone score, i.e., we construct the portfolio according to the media tone score at the beginning of each year. For example, to construct the monthly reputation portfolios in 2004, we use the media tone score as of 31
December 2003. Then we form quartiles, but are primarily interested in the top and bottom quartiles (which represent firms with the best and worst corporate reputation during any given month, respectively). After sorting firms into portfolios, we compute equally-weighted monthly portfolio returns. Following prior literature (e.g., Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Armstrong et al., 2011) , equal weights for firms within each portfolio are assigned to avoid placing too much emphasis on larger firms. Equally-weighted portfolios are usually calculated by purchasing a portfolio, holding it for one month, and then re-balancing the portfolio so that it has equal weights at the start of each month. However, the concern with this approach is that frequent re-balancing can produce biased estimates of realised returns because of bid-ask bounce.
To ensure that results are conservative and not subject to this bias, we compute returns to an equally-weighted 'buy-and-hold' portfolio that is re-balanced annually. Intuitively, using annual re-balancing suggests that corporate reputation is 'sticky', which implies that the public perception of a firm's corporate reputation is not subject to short-term volatility. Furthermore, individual investors are usually passive investors that re-balance their portfolios less frequently than institutional investors. We refrain to use an extended time frame for portfolio construction, e.g., two to three years, as prior research has shown that retention performance of news stories (i.e., the ability of individuals to correctly recall the content of the news story) diminishes over time horizons greater than one year (Meeter et al., 2005) . Next we use the Carhart (1997) fourfactor model to control for market risk and to estimate risk-adjusted performance on the null hypothesis that corporate reputation has no effect on expected returns:
where rp,t is the monthly return minus the 30-day treasury bill return (risk-free rate) of the respective portfolio (e.g., top or bottom corporate reputation portfolio); RMRF is the excess return on the value-weighted accumulation index including all major Asia-Pacific stock exchange stocks; and SMB, HML, and WML are returns on value-weighted zero-investment, factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market equity, and one-year momentum in stock returns, respectively. To perform the asset pricing tests, we use local Asian-Pacific factors. For instance, Griffin (2002) suggests that local factors outperform global factors in explaining stock returns based on a sample of UK, Japanese and Canadian returns. We tested for serial correlation (up to 6 lags) using the Breusch-Godfrey test and for non-stationarity using the 
where the annualized return of firm i minus the risk-free rate is regressed on our measure of corporate reputation (MEDTONE) and other known determinants of stock returns. We chose to estimate models (4) and (5) using FE estimators, since we cannot rule out the possibility that unobserved individual differences between firms affect the results (ai in equations 4 and 5).
While it could be argued that FE estimators are preferred over random-effects (RE) estimators on the basis that unobservable variables such as management style are likely to be highly correlated with our corporate reputation measure, we also empirically tested whether FE estimators are favored to the RE specification. We used the Hausman specification test, in which the null hypothesis (H0) is that the RE specification is the appropriate specification versus the alternative hypothesis (H1) that the FE specification is appropriate. Based on the Hausman test results for the overall effect (Panel A) and the period-specific effect (Panel B), we found that the null hypothesis is rejected. We, therefore, concluded that the FE model is the appropriate -and hence our preferred -specification. We also clustered standard errors by firm in both instances, so that estimates are robust to observations being potentially correlated within firms.
In model (4), we include firm size as measured by the market value of equity (Size), and book-to-market-ratio (BTM), constructed as the book value per share divided by the market value of equity per share at the end of the financial year. Market risk (i.e., beta) is estimated using weekly returns over the two years prior to the end of financial year t (Fama & French, 1993) ; and momentum (PR6M) is calculated as the stock return six months prior to the financial year-end (Carhart, 1997) . We also control for any time-specific effects by including a dummy and POST-CRISIS, to investigate the corporate reputation effect conditional upon the respective time period. As with model (4), we expect a positive association of our return measure with the interaction terms, for our trading strategy to perform well in each sub-period.
However, for both models it should be noted that to replicate the returns implied by the coefficients, the investment strategy would have to take a small positive or negative position in every firm.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In Table 1 we provide a summary of the market-adjusted returns of the corporate reputation strategy for our sample of ASX 200 firms. Stocks are ranked based on their MEDTONE score and allocated into quartiles for each year, and a hedge portfolio is formed that is long in the most positive MEDTONE stocks and short in the most negative MEDTONE stocks. The average of quartile returns are adjusted for the ASX 200 'Total Return' index. Panel A shows the performance of each corporate reputation portfolio and of our trading strategy across the entire observation period for one-, three-, six-and twelve-months forward. Overall, we find that our strategy generates marginal negative market adjusted returns for the one-and threemonth periods (-0.59% and -1.33%, respectively). However, buying stocks with the best corporate reputation and shorting stocks with the worst significantly underperforms over a holding period of six to twelve months, with a negative return of -2.70% and -6.50% (t-stat = -4.281, p < 0.001).
[Insert Table 1 Here]
In Panel B, performance is broken down into each of the three distinct sub-periods of our sampling period. Panel B shows similar results to Panel A, but the spread decreases gradually from the pre-crisis to post-crisis period. While our trading strategy generates significantly negative three-, six-and twelve-month forward returns in the pre-crisis period (t = -2.217, p < 0.05; t = -3.217, p < 0.01 and t = -3.962, p < 0.001, respectively), during the crisis period only the twelve-month forward return spread between the bottom portfolio and the top portfolio is significantly different from zero (t = 3.903, p < 0.001). By contrast, none of the forward return spreads are significantly different during the post-crisis period. While this precursory analysis shows that there might be significant differences in return performance for firms with good versus bad corporate reputation, it should be kept in mind that these differences may disappear when adjusting for factors such as risk and size. Therefore, we analyse risk-adjusted performance next.
For our trading strategy, we divide our sample into top and bottom quartiles according to MEDTONE scores and run the Carhart model using the Asia-Pacific factors provided on Kenneth French's website. The results are presented in Table 2 . As shown in Panel A, Table 2 the top portfolio only loads significantly on market risk, which is consistent with capital asset pricing theory (MktRFTOP = 0.46, p < 0.001). Compared to the returns of the ASX 200, broader market investment is preferred. The same also applies to the bottom portfolio (MktRFBOTTOM = 0.465, p < 0.001).
In addition, the alpha in the bottom portfolio is significant which indicates that the bottom portfolio generates excess returns above and beyond returns that are explained by common factors such as market risk, size, value or momentum (α = 0.012, p < 0.05). This finding suggests that our trading strategy that goes long in firms with good corporate reputation and short sells firms with bad corporate reputation, in fact, underperformed across the entire time period examined.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The same analysis was then conducted with period-specific alpha factors. In Panel B of Table 2 , we see that in addition to market risk, past return performance significantly explains the returns of the bottom portfolio (WML = -0.366, p < 0.05). The negative WML coefficient indicates that the bottom portfolio is inherently contrarian, i.e., investing into companies with low past return performance yields significant return outperformance the following year (and vice-versa).
The findings show that significant excess returns in the bottom portfolio are mainly attributable to a positive alpha throughout the pre-crisis period, suggesting that during bull markets risk appetite is heightened (αPRE-CRISISBottom = 0.025, p < 0.01), while the top portfolio also significantly outperforms in the pre-crisis period (αPRE-CRISISTop = 0.012, p < 0.01). These findings indicate that qualitative aspects, like corporate reputation, appear to contribute to their return performance and therefore should be taken into consideration by investors. Turning our attention to the alpha factors that represent the crisis and post-crisis periods, we find that the bottom portfolio underperforms on a risk-adjusted basis, supporting the contrarian nature of the strategy (αCRISISBottom = -0.026, p < 0.05). Therefore, corporate reputation may be a driver of future return performance (which is examined further in the following analyses).
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To put this finding into perspective, we, in fact, provide a close-up insight into the study by Fang & Peress (2009) who argue that firms with high media coverage do not generate riskadjusted returns compared to firms with low media coverage. Using only companies with high media-visibility, we show that this conjecture is only true if media coverage is neutral.
Contrasting the relationship between corporate reputation and investment performance across divergent market conditions, we find evidence that literature suggesting a positive association between their measure of corporate reputation and return performance (e.g., Pfarrer et al., 2010) may be an artefact of the period under study. Compared to companies with good reputation, poor corporate reputation seems to be inherently more risky given the more pronounced swings in return performance across market conditions.
In Table 3 , Panels A, B and C, we present the results of the top and bottom corporate reputation portfolios, and with the ASX 200, respectively. Notably, the findings reflect the results discussed in Table 2 . For example, Panel B shows that the top corporate reputation portfolio significantly differs on the HML and marginally on the WML loadings from the ASX 200 based on local factors (HML χ 2 = 4.24, p < 0.05; WML χ 2 = 3.16, p = 0.075). It appears that the top portfolio is more value orientated than the ASX 200, which indicates that the portfolio contains more firms with higher book-to-market ratios. Further, we find that the return of the past performance mimicking portfolio is marginally correlated with the returns of the top portfolio. However, contradictory to expectations, we find that the association is negative, which suggests that investing in the top reputation firms is also contrarian in nature.
In turn, Panel C shows that the significant χ 2 on the comparison of the WML factor loading suggests that an investment in the bottom portfolio is indeed a contrarian strategy (WML = -0.366, p < 0.001). The risky nature is also reflected in the comparison of the ASX 200 riskadjusted with the bottom portfolio returns, demonstrating that even after controlling for the short-run opportunity in investing in the ASX 200 index, we can generate risk-adjusted returns beyond common risk factors that are associated with the corporate reputation of a firm.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
In lieu of Australian factor loadings, the final testing complements the previous portfolio return tests to assess whether corporate reputation has the capability to predict stock returns based on purely Australian data. Table 4 presents the results of these tests. The first regression in Panel A shows a significantly negative relation with firm size (Size), which corresponds with prior evidence that small firms generate greater returns compared to larger companies. Future returns correlate with Market risk in the expected direction, however, this relation is not significant in explaining future returns.
The association with the book-to-market ratio (BTM) and the momentum factor (PR6M)
shows that it is not consistent with prior capital asset pricing studies. The significantly negative association of future annual returns with PR6M exhibits an underlying contrarian attitude in explaining future outperformance with past underperformance. The negative relation with value (BTM), while not significant, suggests that investors attach greater risk to growth stocks rather than value stocks over the examined sample period. This observation may reflect the characteristics of the underlying sample period, which due to the recent financial crisis may not align with prior evidence from non-crisis periods.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
In our sample, future one-year forward return is significantly negatively related to prior return and is negatively associated with MEDTONE after controlling for common determinants of stock performance and time-specific effects, supporting the main findings from Table 2 .
Contrary to our expectations, this result suggests that higher future returns are associated with lower corporate reputation, highlighting the contrarian nature of the trading strategy established above. In Panel B, examining the time-specific effect of MEDTONE by interacting the MEDTONE ranking with the CRISIS and POST-CRISIS variables demonstrates that this trading strategy is mainly attributable to the risk-appetite prior to the crisis, as represented in the significantly negative coefficient on MEDTONE (Coef. = -0.031, p < 0.05). This finding represents the relation of future returns with corporate reputation after controlling for the effect of MEDTONE during the crisis (CRISIS*MEDTONE) and after the crisis (POST-
CRISIS*MEDTONE).
CONCLUSION
This paper empirically examines whether investors are able to generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns in the Australian market based on media-specific firm reputational factors under market uncertainty. Results show that firms with poor corporate reputation outperformed the market in the combined period under investigation but are mainly driven by positive returns in the pre-GFC period. However, positive returns for poor corporate reputation firms significantly reversed in the GFC and post-GFC periods. Thus, investing in the broader market and/or short selling the risky bottom corporate reputation portfolio would have proved to be a more successful approach during these periods. The findings also indicate that after controlling for crisis-centric time periods and standard market risk factors, contrarian trading strategies produce abnormal returns for poor corporate reputation firms but not for their good corporate reputation counterparts.
The poor reputation portfolio may have delivered higher returns due to the inherent risks associated with companies that are negatively framed by the media and/or have weak relations with the media, investment and broader communities; thus, supporting modern portfolio theory (Fama, 1998; Fama & MacBeth, 1973; Markowitz, 1959; Sharpe, 1964) . For instance, the poor reputation portfolio was riskier than the good reputation portfolio, and thus, delivered higher/lower returns under favourable/unfavourable economic conditions.
Further, the results of this study are consistent with the work of DeBondt & Thaler (1985) .
DeBondt & Thaler's 'overreaction' hypothesis purports that stock markets are mean-reverting over longer time horizons and that prior stock market 'losers' are better investments than prior 'winners'. This phenomenon implies that media framing conveys qualitative information that
is not yet incorporated into the stock prices of poor reputation firms. As such, corporate reputation may be a driver of performance for poorly performing Australian firms and could be considered a stimulus for trading activity due to its explanatory capabilities.
Our study is the first to test return performance for a selection of firms according to a corporate reputation measure that quantifies how Australian companies are presented ('framed') in the media. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence on whether a favourable corporate reputation leads to higher abnormal risk-adjusted returns in an Australian market context, and across divergent market conditions. It extends research (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008 ) that public information conveyed through the media can be useful in predicting future financial performance. However, unlike Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al., (2008) , who examine market sentiment, we empirically examine individual firm reputation and whether affective tone influences share price performance.
Moreover, the study adds to our understanding of the association of investment returns and corporate reputation by challenging the efficient market and investor sentiment hypotheses and other findings in the existing literature. For instance, studies suggest that corporate reputation is positively associated with investor returns (Barber & Odean, 2008; Eccles & Vollbracht, 2006; Frieder & Subrahmanyam, 2005; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2005; Wei et al., 2013 ). Yet, it should be borne in mind that the findings presented here may be a result of our corporate reputation measure. Future research is, therefore, encouraged to replicate our approach within different time periods and samples to provide a better understanding of the relationship between corporate reputation (as presented in the media) and return performance.
The study also contributes to modern asset pricing theory in that it examines the performance of a speculative corporate reputation-driven trading strategy before, during and after a crisis period which is not yet well understood in the literature. For example, we show that divergent market conditions can moderate the effect of corporate reputation on stock returns. Our findings are of particular relevance for investors and firms interested in whether media image of a firm is, in fact, a valuable resource, reflecting the public recognition of the firm's underlying capabilities and providing a precursor to separate 'winners' from 'losers'.
One limitation of the study is the ability of an investment strategy based on corporate reputation to consistently generate above-average returns above a naïve buy-and-hold approach, as the strategy yielded inconsistent returns across different market conditions for both top and bottom corporate reputation portfolios. As such, investors should be cautious in relying how companies are framed in the media when investing. Also, transaction costs are ignored in examining the performance of the top and bottom portfolios. Transaction costs may affect risk-adjusted returns and overall profitability of the trading strategy.
The risk-adjusted return performance of the 'combined' top and bottom portfolios was also not considered. The investment characteristics of the respective portfolios appear to be consistent with modern portfolio theory. For example, the poor reputation portfolio was riskier than the good reputation portfolio, and hence, provided higher/lower returns under favourable/unfavourable economic conditions. Using this rationale it is hypothesized that an equally-weighted portfolio comprising both poor and good reputation companies should achieve better risk-adjusted returns, regardless of market conditions. Therefore, an avenue for future research is the effect of transaction costs on the profitability of the trading strategy in Australia and abroad, while simultaneously combining top and bottom corporate reputation portfolios to illustrate potential diversification benefits. Such research will further develop our understanding of this interesting capital market phenomenon, improve the marketability of the trading strategy and encourage similar innovative trading strategies.
FIGURE 1
Sector distribution of ASX 200 companies included in the sample Four portfolios are formed based on the firm MEDTONE ranking at the beginning of each calendar year. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, return calculation is commenced one month after the observation of MEDTONE. ASX 200 'Total Return' index is used as the benchmark. Returns reported in the table are calculated as the rolling one-, three-, six-and twelve-month ahead returns of each portfolio as: − , = ∏ (1 + , ) − ∏ (1 + , ) , where , is the return of the portfolio in month t, , is the return on the ASX 200, and t equals 1, 3, 6 or 12, respectively, depending on the length of the period under study. Reported t-statistic tests whether the forward returns of the top portfolio are significantly different from the forward returns of the bottom portfolio. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Carhart (1997) four-factor model to estimate risk-adjusted returns (α factor) for the top and bottom MEDTONE quartiles. The factors used in the model are: MktRF = average return of market-mimicking portfolio less risk-free rate, SMB = average return on equal-weighted small stock portfolio minus the average return on equal-weighted large stock portfolio. HML = average return on equal-weighted portfolio on growth stock portfolio (high BTM) minus the average return on equalweighted value stock portfolio (low BTM). WML = average return on equal-weighted portfolio of winner portfolio (high previous 12-month return) minus the average return on equal-weighted portfolio of loser portfolio (low previous 12-month return performance). *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Tested for serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey with up to 6 lags) and non-stationarity (augmented Dickey-Fuller). Results show that there is no serial correlation or non-stationarity. Therefore, model is run as originally proposed. (4) 
